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LET THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME:
SANCTIONING ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS FOR
FAILURE TO RESPOND TO POSTCERTIFICATION
DISCOVERY REQUESTS
Elizabeth A. Kalenik*
Courts rarely allow defendants to take discovery of absent class members
after class action certification. However, if a court does permit such
discovery and some absentees fail to respond, should the court sanction the
nonresponsive absentees? Under what circumstances should the court
dismiss the nonresponsive absentees? When considering whether and what
sanctions to impose, courts make a decision about the rights and role of
absentees in class actions.
This Note examines postcertification absentee discovery sanctions
through a discussion of group litigation. Next, it analyzes the reasoning of
courts that have dismissed absentees, declined to dismiss absentees, and
imposed other sanctions on absentees. Finally, this Note concludes that
courts should generally dismiss opt-out absentees without prejudice, and
dismiss opt-in absentees with prejudice.
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INTRODUCTION
In a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action, a group of retail store managers
allege that their employer incorrectly classified them as exempt from laws
mandating overtime wages.1 After the class is certified, the employer
attempts to derail the class action by showing that it properly classified the
employees as managerial employees. To this end, the employer moves to
serve interrogatories on the employees, seeking information about their job
duties. The court permits the discovery, but more than half of the
employees fail to respond. The employer is now prejudiced because it lacks
information that is crucial for its defense. Accordingly, the employer
moves to dismiss the nonresponsive absentees. However, if the court orders
dismissal, the employees must either opt in by completing the discovery or
be excluded. How can the court ameliorate the employer’s prejudice
without distorting the opt-out scheme of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action?2
1. The facts described in this paragraph mirror the facts in Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores,
Inc., Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC, 2011 WL 843956 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011). See infra
notes 296–302 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 347–51 and accompanying text.
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Postcertification discovery of absentees is rarely used and is neither
precluded nor endorsed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).3
However, most courts have concluded that such discovery may be
permissible where it is not being used to harass the absentees and the
defendant cannot obtain the information from the class representative(s).4
Yet, when such discovery is undertaken and some absentees fail to respond,
courts are divided on whether and how to sanction the nonresponsive
absentees.5
In Part I, this Note explores group litigation procedure, the due process
rights of absent members, and discovery sanctions. In so doing, Part I
provides a background for understanding the arguments addressed in Part
II.
Part II analyzes the decisions of courts that have dismissed
nonresponsive absentees, courts that have declined to dismiss
nonresponsive absentees, and courts that have imposed other sanctions on
nonresponsive absentees. In Part III, this Note argues that courts should
generally dismiss nonresponsive absentees without prejudice in opt-out
actions, and with prejudice in opt-in actions.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: ALL ABOUT GROUP LITIGATION
This part provides the context for the conflict with an overview of the
types of group litigation in which courts have ordered absent member
discovery. First, Part I.A examines two types of federal group litigation:
Rule 23 class actions and Fair Labor Standards Act6 (FLSA) collective
actions. Part I.B examines the procedure of state class actions. When
discussing state class actions, Part I.B focuses on the procedures of
California and Alaska, two states that have considered whether to dismiss
nonresponsive absentees.
Next, Part I.C turns to a discussion of the due process rights of Rule 23
absentees, an issue that figures in plaintiffs’ arguments against sanctioning
nonresponsive members. Part I.D then examines when, how often, and in
what types of cases federal and state courts have ordered absentee
discovery. Part I concludes with an overview of federal and state discovery
sanctions, many of which courts have considered imposing on absentees.
A. Federal Group Litigation: Rule 23 Class Actions and Fair Labor
Standards Act Collective Actions
This section discusses Rule 23 class actions and FLSA class actions, two
kinds of aggregate litigation in which courts have ordered discovery and
ultimately sanctioned nonresponsive absentees. First, this section examines
the history, procedural mechanisms, and policies behind Rule 23 class
3.
4.
5.
6.

See infra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 147, 160–64 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
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actions. Second, this section considers the history, procedural mechanisms,
and policies behind FLSA collective actions.
1. Rule 23: History, Policy, and Certification Procedures
A class action is a form of group litigation in which a class representative
sues on behalf of many people who have suffered the same harm.7
Traditionally, it is said that the representative is the named plaintiff, and the
members of the class are the absent members.8 The named plaintiff stands
in judgment for the absent members.9 The individual members need not be
present; by being adequately represented,10 each member has “the
functional equivalent of a day in court.”11 Accordingly, if there is any
judgment in the action, the judgment binds all the members of the class.12
The procedure of class actions was originally an equitable mechanism
developed to resolve common disputes in an efficient manner.13 In federal
court, class actions are governed by FRCP 23.14 Rule 23 was created to
protect the rights of class members and defendants, assure efficiency in
litigation and remedies, and assist in law enforcement.15 By encompassing
all members that meet a class definition, class actions efficiently resolve
claims with less risk of contrary judgments.16 For defendants, class actions
can be an opportunity to obtain a “bill of peace” on a set of identical claims
by resolving all those claims at the same time.17
Further, class actions assist in regulation because the mechanism enables
plaintiffs to sue for small injuries by combining many claims.18 By
combining many claims, the plaintiff has more resources with which to
combat the defendant.19 In turn, class action litigation of such claims can

7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 1:1, at 2 (5th ed. 2011); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21, at
358–59 (2012) (explaining that a class action aggregates claims and thus can “increase the
stakes” of the litigation).
8. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:5, at 12.
9. See id.
10. Class members are represented by a class representative and class counsel. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), 23(g).
11. 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1786, at
496 (3d ed. 2005).
12. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:5, at 12.
13. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Pre-certification Communication Ethics in Class Actions, 36
GA. L. REV. 353, 359 (2002); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) advisory committee’s note (1937
Adoption) (noting that Rule 23 is a restatement of the former Equity Rule 38).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
15. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1259–60 (2002).
16. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:9, at 26–27.
17. See id. § 1:9, at 27.
18. See id. § 1:7, at 18.
19. See id. § 1:7, at 19.
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put pressure on repeat defendants to obey laws that might not otherwise be
enforced.20
Absent members have few duties in class action litigation because the
named plaintiff actively participates in the litigation on behalf of the class.21
For instance, absent members generally do not have to appear before court
or hire counsel.22 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “an absent classaction plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may sit back and allow
the litigation to run its course.”23
Rule 23 does not address the duties of absent members.24 Thus, courts
disagree about whether absent members should be subject to certain duties,
such as the duty to answer discovery requests25 and to be subject to
counterclaims.26 When making a decision about the duties of the absentees
in a particular case, courts should consider the goals of the particular
litigation.27 Generally, courts should ensure that the absent members’
rights are represented at each stage of the litigation.28 Additionally, courts
should seek to maintain the efficiency of class actions and judicial
economy.29 In Part I.D, this Note considers how courts have applied this
analysis to absent member discovery.
A class action begins when the class representative files a complaint on
behalf of a purported class.30 The court then determines whether the class
can be certified.31 Because any judgment binds all absent members,32
20. See Bone & Evans, supra note 15, at 1260 n.22 (explaining that individual plaintiffs’
claims are too small to pursue in securities fraud and antitrust cases and thus some securities
and antitrust laws would be underenforced without the class action mechanism). But see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 669, 680 (1986) (noting that class actions carry a risk of overenforcement, because a
fee-motivated plaintiffs’ attorney might sue where a class member might be more concerned
about the negative long-term impacts of the litigation).
21. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985); see also 1
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:5, at 12–13.
22. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 810.
23. Id.
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; 5 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 16:1, at 118 (4th ed. 2002).
25. See infra Part I.D.
26. See 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 16:1, at 120.
27. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002) (“The label ‘party’ does not
indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability of various
procedural rules that may differ based on context.”); see also 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra
note 24, § 16:1, at 120 (explaining that courts can consider the circumstances under which
the absent members’ duties have become relevant).
28. See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
29. See id. at 11 (citing Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 629 (11th Cir. 1987) (observing
that one of the purposes of class action litigation is “preventing multiple suits”); Jeremy
Bertsch, Note, Missing the Mark: The Search for an Effective Class Certification Process,
39 VAL. U. L. REV. 95, 116 (2004).
30. See Bassett, supra note 13, at 360.
31. See id. at 363.
32. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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certifying a class of members with the same interests is critical.33 Such a
binding judgment would be unfair if the class members did not have
common interests.34 Accordingly, the Rule 23(a) requirements ensure that
the class members have the same interests and that maintaining a class
action is feasible.35 Additionally, all class actions must satisfy the
requirements of one of the three Rule 23(b) class types.36 The Rule 23(b)
requirements further ensure class cohesion by limiting the kinds of class
actions that can be maintained.37
The Rule 23(a) requirements are numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequacy.38 Under the numerosity requirement, the class must be so
large that it is impractical to join the claims of all the class members.39 The
commonality requirement ensures that questions of law or fact are common
to the class.40 To satisfy the typicality requirement, the claims of the class
representative(s) must be typical of the claims of the absent members.41
Finally, under the adequacy requirement, the named plaintiff must “fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.”42 As this Note will later
discuss in Part I.C, adequacy is one of the mechanisms that protects absent
members’ due process rights.43
After a class action meets the Rule 23(a) requirements, it must meet the
requirements of either (b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3).44
There are two
subcategories of Rule 23(b)(1) class actions.45 Both kinds of (b)(1) class
actions are mandatory class actions, meaning that absent members cannot
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Bone & Evans, supra note 15, at 1261–62 (explaining that
proper class certification is critical because judgment in a Rule 23 action precludes absent
members from bringing their claims to court again).
34. Such a class action would violate due process requirements because the absent
members’ interests would not be represented in court. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
42–43 (1940).
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
37. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:3, at 5.
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
39. Id. 23(a)(1); see Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir.
1995) (citing 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3.05 (2d ed. 1985))
(explaining that numerosity is presumed where there are forty class members or more).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). Commonality of all issues of law or fact is not required; a
core of shared legal issues or facts satisfies the commonality requirement. See Hanlon v.
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). Courts have struggled to define the meaning of the
typicality requirement as distinguished from the adequacy requirement. Some courts have
concluded that the typicality requirement strengthens the adequacy requirement, and assures
that the representative will adequately represent the absent members. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 11, § 1764, at 259–60.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Adequacy must be scrutinized because “the fate of the class
members is to a considerable extent in the hands of a single plaintiff,” and the named
plaintiff may have no stake or a nominal stake in the class action. Culver v. City of
Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002).
43. See infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
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request exclusion from the class.46 Accordingly, courts are permitted, but
not required, to notify the members of the class action.47
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class actions are incompatible standards class actions
and are appropriate where prosecuting individual actions would create a risk
of inconsistent judgments.48 These class actions are mandatory because
allowing plaintiffs to sue individually would undermine the goal of
reaching a consistent judgment.49 Situations where a (b)(1)(A) class action
can be maintained include individual suits concerning a riparian owner’s
rights and individual suits against a landowner regarding a nuisance.50
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions are known as limited fund class actions.51
These class actions are permitted where prosecuting individual claims
would be dispositive of other individual claims.52 However, in practice,
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions have been limited to cases that involve a
finite recovery fund.53 If class members sought relief from a finite fund
individually, the fund could be drained, precluding or depleting recovery
for other individuals.54 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions are mandatory
because permitting individual suits would undermine the goal of fairly
distributing the available funds.55
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are known as injunctive relief class actions.56
In (b)(2) class actions, the defendant has acted or refused to act in a way
that generally applies to the whole class, making declaratory or injunctive
relief appropriate.57 Like (b)(1) class actions, (b)(2) class actions are
mandatory class actions.58 Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are mandatory
because the relief sought necessarily applies to the entire class.59
Accordingly, court notice to the class members is permitted but not
required.60
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1), (c)(2)(A).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A); see also 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:3, at 5–6.
49. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4:2, at 11–12
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note (1966 Amendment).
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4:23, at 88.
52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
53. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 21.142, at 380–81 (noting
that in (b)(1)(B) class actions, the judge must find that there is a limited fund and that the
fund would be exhausted).
54. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 849–50 (1999) (decertifying a
(b)(1) class in a suit against an asbestos manufacturer, because there was no evidence that
the fund was limited and insufficient).
55. See 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4:2, at 13–14.
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4:26, at 97.
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); see, e.g., Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir.
1998) (affirming the certification of a (b)(2) class where aliens charged with document fraud
sued the Immigration and Naturalization Service, alleging that the agency’s nationwide
procedures violated their Fifth Amendment right to due process).
58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (permitting, but not requiring, notice of class
certification to the class members); 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 4:26, at 98.
59. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011).
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2), (c)(2)(A).
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Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, known as damages class actions, are
appropriate where common issues predominate over individual issues, and
using class action procedure is a superior way to fairly and efficiently
adjudicate the dispute.61 It is often less clear that class action treatment is
appropriate in damages class actions than in mandatory class actions,
because individual issues may be significant.62 Accordingly, a (b)(3) class
action must meet the predominance and superiority requirements.63 When
analyzing predominance, courts assess whether common questions
predominate over individual questions.64 In doing so, courts compare
individual claims and defenses to common claims and defenses.65 In
deciding whether a class action is a superior method, the court must
consider the members’ interest in maintaining individual actions, whether
and what kind of litigation has already been started by the class members,
how desirable it is to maintain the claims in that particular forum, and the
difficulties of managing the action.66
Because damages class actions may be less cohesive than mandatory
class actions,67 damages class actions permit members to request exclusion
from the class in a so-called “opt-out mechanism.”68 If an absent member
is excluded from the class, any judgment in the action will not bind that
member.69 Additionally, (b)(3) absent members have the right to
participate in the action by intervening in person or through an attorney.70
Accordingly, courts must send “the best notice practicable” to the class
members in clear and concise language.71
After the class is certified, the court can consider the claims and defenses
of the parties.72 However, certification legitimizes the class, which puts
pressure on the defendant to settle the claims.73 For defendants, the

61. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
624–25 (1997) (holding that the predominance requirement was not satisfied by the class
members’ exposure to asbestos and interest in receiving compensation; in fact, each
member’s case was unique because the class members had different injuries and varying
exposure to asbestos).
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966 Amendment).
63. Id.
64. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 21.142, at 382.
65. See id.
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D).
67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
69. See supra text accompanying note 12.
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
71. Id.; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 21.31, at 459–60.
72. See Jeff Kosseff, Note, The Elusive Value: Protecting Privacy During Class Action
Discovery, 97 GEO. L.J. 289, 295 (2008).
73. See id. (citing THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 61 (1996), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf).
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possibility of an “all-or-nothing verdict” can be too risky, even if there is a
low probability of a plaintiffs’ verdict.74
While class actions can be a useful aggregative device, class actions are
often brought by “entrepreneurial” lawyers, carry a risk of unmanageability,
and can skew the outcome of a trial.75 Plaintiffs’ class action attorneys are
incentivized to act as entrepreneurs in their own interest, because they stand
to gain large fees from the litigation and are not closely monitored by free
rider absent members.76 Because of the entrepreneurial nature of class
actions, class actions are driven by attorney’s fees rather than by the
interests of the class.77 Where a plaintiffs’ attorney’s interests are
unaligned with the interests of the class, an attorney may act contrary to the
interests of the class.78 Further, when individual issues or damages play a
prominent role in a class action, the action may become unmanageable.79
Finally, by combining many claims into one litigation, class actions raise
the stakes of the litigation for the defendant.80 As such, class actions
increase the chances that the defendant will be held liable.81
2. Party Plaintiffs: Fair Labor Standards Act Collective Actions
Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act allows an employee to
bring an action on behalf of “similarly situated” employees against an
employer for unpaid wages.82 FLSA collective actions differ from Rule 23

74. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995)).
75. See generally Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems:
Variations and Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 401–03
(2003) (discussing the drawbacks of American class actions and comparing them to foreign
group litigation devices).
76. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1991). But see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action
Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2056–57 (2010) (arguing that class
actions lawyers should receive 100 percent of the settlement proceeds in small stakes cases,
because those cases serve a deterrence function, not a compensation function); Myriam
Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social
Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105–07 (2007) (arguing that
class counsel overcompensation and class member undercompensation should be of little
concern, because class actions serve the purpose of deterring corporate wrongdoing).
77. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 680.
78. See Macey & Miller, supra note 76, at 12–13.
79. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)
(decertifying a class of one and a half million women alleging sex discrimination in a Rule
23(b)(2) class action, because there was no common answer as to why the women were
discriminated against).
80. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).
81. See id.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
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class actions in both certification and discovery procedure.83 While the
certification procedure of Rule 23 class actions varies depending on the
type of class action and claims asserted,84 all FLSA actions are opt-in
actions.85 This means that the members must affirmatively consent to be
included in the judgment.86 The consenting members are known as “party
plaintiffs.”87 Additionally, unlike Rule 23 class actions, discovery of FLSA
members is a regular occurrence.88
The FLSA was enacted in 1938 to combat substandard workplace
conditions that were detrimental to the health and well-being of workers.89
Among other reforms, the FLSA set a minimum wage and required
overtime pay for work over forty hours a week.90 FLSA provisions are
mainly enforced through collective actions brought under 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b).91 Additionally, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 are enforced under
§ 216(b).92
Courts have split on § 216(b) certification procedure.93 Section 216(b)
itself does not provide any guidance on how to determine whether a group
of employees is “similarly situated.”94 Most courts take an “ad hoc” twostep approach when deciding whether the employees are similarly situated,
although a minority of courts apply Rule 23(a) requirements.95
The two-step certification process involves taking an “ad hoc” look at
whether the employees in the action are similarly situated.96 In the first
step, the court reviews the complaint and supporting affidavits to determine
whether a group of similarly situated employees exists.97 If the court finds
83. See Khadera v. ABM Indus. Inc., No. C08-417RSM, 2011 WL 3651031, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 18, 2011) (comparing the opt-in provision of § 216(b) to Rule 23);
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 32.42, at 811.
84. See supra Part I.A.1.
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
89. See Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts Use Procedural Rules To
Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 727, 730–31
(2010).
90. See id. at 731.
91. See James M. Fraser, Note, Opt-In Actions Under the FLSA, EPA, and ADEA: What
Does It Mean To Be “Similarly Situated”?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 99 & n.35 (2005).
92. See id. at 105.
93. See Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts
Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 535 (2012).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
95. See Moss & Ruan, supra note 93, at 535–36.
96. The first case to employ the two-step process was Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118
F.R.D. 351, 361–63 (D.N.J. 1987); see also Allan G. King & Camille C. Ozumba, Strange
Fiction: The “Class Certification” Decision in FLSA Collective Actions, 24 LAB. LAW. 267,
275 (2009) (explaining the procedure of the Lusardi two-step).
97. See Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2007). Because the
first-step certification decision is based on pleadings and affidavits, the first-step certification
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that the complaint identifies a group of similarly situated employees, the
class is conditionally certified.98 Notice of the collective action is sent to
the employees, and the employees must return the consent form to the court
to be included in the action.99
During the second step, the defendant employer ordinarily makes a
motion to decertify the class, and the court reviews whether the members
are similarly situated with more scrutiny.100 The parties serve discovery on
class members to determine whether the members are in fact similarly
situated.101 Unlike Rule 23 class actions, courts have broad discretion to
order class-wide or representative sampling discovery of plaintiffs in FLSA
collective actions.102 In deciding whether the plaintiffs are similarly
situated, the court can consider the employees’ placement and locations, the
employer’s defenses against individual plaintiffs, and fairness and
procedural considerations.103 If the court finds that the plaintiffs are not
similarly situated, the class is decertified and the plaintiffs are dismissed
without prejudice.104 If the court finds that the plaintiffs are similarly
situated, the named plaintiff(s) and the defendant proceed to the merits of
the case.105
Under the Rule 23(a) approach, the court determines whether the class is
similarly situated by analyzing whether the class satisfies the 23(a)
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements.106 At
least one court has recognized that the opt-in mechanism of § 216(b) is
contrary to the opt-out mechanism of Rule 23 class actions.107 However,
the court reasoned that this discrepancy does not necessarily make every
standard is lenient. See id. (citing Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1214 (5th
Cir. 1995)).
98. See id.
99. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170–71 (1989) (holding that
plaintiffs can seek court assistance in finding and notifying similarly situated members).
100. See Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953.
101. See 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1807, at 495–96; see, e.g., Anderson, 488
F.3d at 953 (explaining that discovery informs the second step of the process).
102. See Smith v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 354, 357–58 (S.D. Ohio 2006)
(surveying cases discussing FLSA discovery procedure and concluding that representative
sampling discovery is appropriate during step-two certification of a 1,500 employee class);
Coldiron v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. CV03–05865TJHMCX, 2004 WL 2601180, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 25, 2004) (permitting individualized discovery of 306 employees, because Pizza Hut
intended to challenge certification by alleging that the employees were not similarly
situated); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1807, at 486.
103. See Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953 (citing Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d
1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213
(5th Cir. 1995) (noting that Lusardi and other two-step cases do not define “similarly
situated” and that, therefore, FLSA cases are analyzed on a case-by-case basis).
104. Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214.
105. Id.
106. See Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 268 (D. Colo. 1990). But
see Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001) (arguing that
the Rule 23(a) certification procedure runs contrary to Congress’s intent).
107. See Shushan, 132 F.R.D. at 266 (citing Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527 F.2d 532,
536 (8th Cir. 1975); LaChapelle v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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part of Rule 23 inapplicable to FLSA collective actions, and the Rule 23(a)
approach provides structure in the certification process.108
B. State Class Action Certification Procedure
This section explores the class action procedure used by states that have
considered whether to dismiss nonresponsive members. It focuses on the
procedure of two states that have produced two of the leading cases on
absentee postcertification discovery sanctions: Alaska and California. In
so doing, this section creates a background for the discussion of these cases
in Part II.
State procedural rules fall into three categories with respect to class
action procedure: Field Code states, original Rule 23 states, and amended
Rule 23 states. In Field Code states, class action procedure is governed by
the Field Code, the influential procedural reform code of the 1800s.109
Original Rule 23 states use the original version of Rule 23, in which class
action procedure is determined by the type of claim being asserted.110
Amended Rule 23 states use one of the amended versions of modern Rule
23, certifying class actions under an older version of Rule 23(a) and
23(b).111
California uses Field Code class action procedure.112 In the Field Code,
class certification is based on the straightforward rule that “[W]hen the
question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when
the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all
before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the
whole.”113 Field Code procedure requires that there be an ascertainable
class and interest in the common issues.114
Alaska’s class action certification procedure tracks federal Rule 23 class
action certification procedure.115 Although some wording in Alaska’s Rule

108. See id.
109. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A
Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 327–34
(1988) (discussing the features of the Field Code and their relation to modern procedural
rules).
110. See 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 13:3, at 400.
111. See id. § 13:4, at 401–02; see also Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in
State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a
Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (2005) (surveying
variations in state class action discovery rules).
112. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 2007).
113. See 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 13:2, at 399–400. The Field Code
merged law and equity into one code in 1848. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 932, 939 (1987). The Field Code is the predecessor of about half the
states’ modern day procedural codes. See id.
114. See 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 13:2, at 400.
115. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 23.
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23 differs from the current federal Rule 23, the substance of Alaska’s
certification procedure mirrors federal certification procedure.116
C. Due Process Rights of Rule 23 Absent Members: Notice and the
Opportunity To Be Heard
This section discusses the due process rights of absent members. Class
counsel often invoke these rights when arguing that courts should not
impose sanctions on nonresponsive members.117 The due process clause
provides that the government shall not deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.118 The due process clause guarantees
notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to a deprivation of life, liberty,
or property.119 Pursuant to the guarantee of the opportunity to be heard, all
Rule 23 absent members are entitled to adequate representation.120
However, an absentee’s right to notice varies according to the type of class
action.121 In mandatory class actions, notice of any class certification
decision is not required;122 in opt-out class actions, notice of any class
certification decision is mandatory.123
Class actions are an exception to the general rule that one cannot be
bound by a judgment in a litigation to which one is not a party.124 Because
absent members do not actively participate in a class action, procedural
mechanisms must ensure that the members’ interests are protected.125 The
procedural mechanism of adequate representation ensures that absent
members are bound by a judgment only where the named plaintiff
adequately represents the class.126 Consequently, the class representative
must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”127 To fulfill
this requirement, the class representative must not have interests that are
incompatible with the interests of the absent members.128
Additionally, the plaintiffs’ attorney must be experienced and qualified to
represent the absent members.129 Rule 23(g) builds on the adequate

116. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; ALASKA R. CIV. P. 23; see also SECTION OF LITIG., AM. BAR
ASS’N, SURVEY OF STATE CLASS ACTION LAW 2012 ALASKA 21 (2012).
117. See infra Part II.A.2.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. V (provides for due process protections against the federal
government); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (provides for due process protections against
state and local governments).
119. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
121. See supra notes 47, 58, 71 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 47, 58 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
124. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40–41 (1940).
125. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:1, at 2–3.
126. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42–43.
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
128. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
129. See id.
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representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4).130 Under Rule 23(g), added in
2003,131 the court appoints class counsel after considering counsel’s
experience, knowledge of the law, resources, and work already done on the
particular claims.132 Rule 23(g) was enacted because class counsel is “often
critically important to the successful handling of a class action.”133
In addition to the adequate representation requirement, absent members
in (b)(3) class actions are protected by notice.134 In (b)(1) and (b)(2)
mandatory class actions, notice of a class certification decision is
discretionary.135 Because (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes are “homogeneous
without any conflicting interests between the members of the class,” a
binding judgment is not unfair (provided that the absent members have been
adequately represented).136 The certification requirements of mandatory
class actions make it less likely that there will be defenses or issues
pertaining to individual members.137
By contrast, notice is an essential part of the (b)(3) class action
mechanism.138 Because (b)(3) actions do not have as much class cohesion
as (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions, notice is an additional procedural safeguard that
protects the interests of (b)(3) members.139 The notice must describe the
action and the member’s rights in the action.140 Additionally, the notice
must provide the member with an opportunity to be excluded from the class

130. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee’s note (2003 Amendment).
131. Id.
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(i); cf. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (2006) (requiring that the court appoint as lead plaintiff the member
who is most capable of adequately representing the absent members’ interests and requiring
the lead plaintiff to “select and retain counsel to represent the class”).
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee’s note (2003 Amendment).
134. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 47, 58 and accompanying text. However, reasonable notice is
required in all Rule 23 class actions of any proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal,
compromise, or claim for attorney’s fees. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1), 23(h)(1). Accordingly,
members of mandatory classes can protect their rights by objecting to a proposed resolution.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1536 (2004).
136. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir. 1975); accord Durrett v.
John Deere Co., 150 F.R.D. 555, 562–63 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (discussing the procedural due
process requirements of (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, as compared to (b)(3) class actions).
137. 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1786, at 496.
138. Id. at 492.
139. See Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs’ Due
Process: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871, 912–13 (1995)
(citing Durrett, 150 F.R.D. at 562); cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2558–59 (2011) (explaining that in (b)(2) class actions, unlike in (b)(3) class actions, relief
necessarily affects the entire class; therefore, notice is not mandatory).
140. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985). The notice must
comply with the Mullane guidelines for notice: it must be the best practicable, reasonably
calculated to inform the members of their rights, and offer the members an opportunity to
object. See id. at 812.
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and the opportunity to participate in the suit in person or through
counsel.141
D. Postcertification Discovery of Absent Members: Rule 23 Class Actions,
FLSA Collective Actions, and State Class Actions
This section discusses when and how absent members may be subject to
discovery in Rule 23 class actions, FLSA collective actions, and California
and Alaska state class actions. Courts are in disagreement as to whether,
and to what extent, Rule 23 absentees should be subject to postcertification
discovery.142 The FRCP does not address the duties of absent class
members.143 Rule 23(d) states that courts may make orders that are
required to efficiently run a proceeding and protect absent members, but
does not contemplate orders directed to absent members.144 Therefore,
courts disagree as to whether absentees can be required to respond to
discovery requests.145 Courts have considered this potential duty in light of
the facts and goals of the particular litigation.146 A majority of the courts
that have reached the issue have concluded that discovery of absentee
members is permissible under certain circumstances.147 However, some
courts have also noted that such discovery should not be allowed as a
routine matter, because it is contrary to the general policy that absent
members need not participate in a class action.148
Courts have considered allowing discovery of absent members in all
three kinds of Rule 23(b) class actions, FLSA collective actions, and state
class actions.149 However, many of the cases analyzing whether such

141. See id.; supra note 70 and accompanying text.
142. Postcertification discovery is discovery relating to the merits of the class members’
claim(s) or the defendant’s defense(s). See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450
F.2d 999, 1004–05 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that discovery of absent members is permissible
if justice requires it and the court takes precautionary measures to protect the absent
members); see also 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1796.1, at 56–57 (noting that the
majority of courts have allowed discovery, at least under some circumstances). But see
Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Fischer v. Wolfinbarger,
55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971) (holding that discovery of absent members is not
permissible).
143. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
144. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d); Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Absent Class Members in
Class Action Under Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure As Subject to Discovery, 13
A.L.R. FED. 255, § 2[a], at 257 (1972).
145. See 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 16:1, at 120.
146. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
147. See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (surveying absentee
member discovery cases and concluding that most courts do not categorically reject
discovery of absent members); see also 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1796.1, at 56–57
(noting that the majority of courts have allowed discovery of absent members).
148. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004–05 (7th Cir.
1971); M. Berenson Co. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 635, 637 (D. Mass.
1984) (citing Dellums, 566 F.2d at 187).
149. See infra Part II.
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discovery is permissible are Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.150 Discovery may
be more useful to defendants in (b)(3) class actions than in mandatory class
actions, because the class is less cohesive.151 Additionally, ordering absent
members to respond to discovery in mandatory Rule 23 class actions may
be more coercive, because those members cannot opt out of the action.152
Courts have considered allowing absentee discovery in many causes of
action, including securities fraud,153 actions for unpaid wages,154
employment discrimination,155 housing discrimination,156 and antitrust
suits.157
Diligent research has failed to uncover any instances in which courts
have considered allowing discovery in Rule 23 negative value class
actions.158 Likely, defendants have not requested such discovery because
the cost of the discovery would exceed any benefit that the defendant could
obtain from the information.159
When deciding whether to permit absent member discovery, courts
consider whether the requested discovery is appropriate in that particular
litigation, the defendant’s need for the information, and the potential burden
on the absent members.160 Courts have granted discovery when the
information relates to common issues, the requests are not unduly
burdensome, and the requested information is unavailable from the

150. See, e.g., Brennan, 450 F.2d at 1001 (noting that the class members could choose to
be excluded from the class); Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC,
2009 WL 1458032, at *7–11 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (holding that the class action
satisfied the Rule 23(b)(3) requirements of predominance and superiority).
151. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
152. See Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 67 F.R.D. 691, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(permitting discovery of (b)(1) absentees, but noting a conflict of interest between the
passive absent members and the information-seeking defendant); see also United States v.
Trucking Emp’rs., Inc., 72 F.R.D. 101, 104 (D.D.C. 1976) (allowing discovery of absent
members in a defendant class, but noting that such discovery might be coercive because
defendant absentees do not have the opportunity to opt out of the class).
153. See, e.g., Arleth v. FMP Operating Co., Civ.A. No. 90-1663, 1991 WL 211521, at
*5–6 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 1991) (securities fraud class action).
154. See, e.g., Cruz, 2011 WL 843956, at *5–8 (employment class action seeking
overtime pay).
155. See, e.g., Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1555–57 (11th Cir. 1986)
(sex discrimination action seeking injunctive and monetary relief).
156. See, e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974). The court
held that the party seeking discovery has the burden of showing that the discovery is proper.
Id. at 340. However, in the racial housing discrimination case at issue, the defendant did not
prove that absent member discovery was necessary. See id. at 340–41.
157. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972)
(declining to dismiss nonresponsive absent members in an antitrust case alleging price fixing
of school milk).
158. See, e.g., 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 16:3, at 133–43 (providing
examples of cases where courts considered the permissibility of absent member discovery).
159. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
160. 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1796.1, at 56–59.
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representative parties.161
Because only common questions are
appropriately resolved in a class action, courts have routinely rejected
postcertification discovery requests where they pertain solely to individual
issues.162 Courts have also rejected discovery requests where it is evident
that the discovery requests are being used as a tactic to scare class members
or to decrease the size of the class.163 Additionally, courts have expressed
concern about discovery requests that are overly complicated or
technical.164
Absent members argue that they have an interest in not actively
participating in a class action,165 not being unduly burdened by
discovery,166 and maintaining the efficiency of class actions.167 Absentees
argue that a defendant may use discovery as a tactic to harass absent
members.168 Such discovery may discourage a member from remaining in
the class, or force a member to hire individual counsel to complete the
request.169
What is more, permitting absent member discovery undermines the
efficiency and intent of Rule 23 class actions by, in effect, creating an optin procedure.170 Rule 23 is an opt-out scheme which includes all class
161. Transamerican Ref. Corp. v. Dravo Corp., 139 F.R.D. 619, 621 (S.D. Tex. 1991)
(citing Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Trucking
Emp’rs., Inc., 72 F.R.D. 101, 104 (D.D.C. 1976)).
162. See Redmond v. Moody’s Investor Serv., 92 CIV. 9161 (WK), 1995 WL 276150, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1995) (citing Enter. Wall Paper Mfg. Co. v. Bodman, 85 F.R.D. 325,
327 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 67 F.R.D. 691, 700 (S.D.N.Y.
1975)).
163. See, e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 340 (7th Cir. 1974)
(reversing an order dismissing nonresponsive members because the defendant never proved
that the discovery was not a scare tactic); see also Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D.
532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (noting that one of the absent members wrote to the court
requesting exclusion from the class because the discovery requests were intimidating).
164. See, e.g., Collins v. Int’l Dairy Queen, 190 F.R.D. 629, 632–33 (M.D. Ga. 1999)
(denying discovery, in part because the interrogatories were so technical that the absent
members would require the assistance of an accountant or an attorney); Kline v. First W.
Gov’t Sec., Inc., No. CIV.A. 83-1076, 1996 WL 122717, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1996)
(noting that the requested interrogatories were complicated, weighing in favor of denying the
discovery request).
165. See Redmond, 1995 WL 276150, at *1 (citing Robertson, 67 F.R.D. at 699).
166. See Dellums, 566 F.2d at 187 (citing Clark, 501 F.2d at 340–41).
167. See Wainwright, 54 F.R.D. at 534 (“The usefulness of Rule 23 would end if class
members could be subjected to Rule 33 and forced to spend time, and perhaps engage legal
counsel, to answer detailed interrogatories.”).
168. See Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding
that the interrogatories were propounded as a tactic to reduce class size); 5 CONTE &
NEWBERG, supra note 24, § 16:3, at 138–39.
169. See Wainwright, 54 F.R.D. at 534; John J. Madden & Denise G. Paully, Making the
Class Determination in Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 807 (1974);
cf. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1971) (noting
that class counsel encouraged the absentees to seek help from either their personal lawyer or
class counsel when answering the interrogatories).
170. Compare Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 313, 319 (D. Colo.
1999) (holding that the proposed questionnaire must be optional, because a mandatory
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members unless they request exclusion.171 Such a procedure helps to
resolve disputes efficiently by resolving as many claims as possible in one
litigation.172 By ordering discovery, courts force members to affirmatively
participate in, or opt into, the action.173 Plaintiffs argue that this effectively
transforms a class action into a “massive joinder” of many individual
claims.174
Defendants argue that they have an interest in obtaining information that
may be necessary to prove a defense.175 Defendants may seek discovery
from absent members to obtain information to support an affirmative
defense,176 to prove that there is no claim,177 or to prove that a class lacks
interest in proceeding as a whole.178 Additionally, absent member
discovery may illuminate the scope of the litigation and provide
information for negotiating a settlement.179
Ironically, discovery of absent members may undermine the efficiency of
Rule 23 in a way that disadvantages not only absent members, but also
defendants. If a court orders discovery and some members do not respond,
the court might dismiss the nonresponsive members.180
If those
nonresponsive members are excluded from the action but can later sue the
defendant on the same claim, the defendant may be subject to repetitive
individual litigation if it cannot reach settlements with those individual

questionnaire would create an opt-in scheme running contrary to Rule 23), with Cruz v.
Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC, 2011 WL 843956, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 8, 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that mandatory discovery creates an opt-in
scheme).
171. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
173. See Wainwright, 54 F.R.D. at 534.
174. Id.
175. See Redmond v. Moody’s Investor Serv., 92 CIV. 9161 (WK), 1995 WL 276150, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1995) (citing Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 67 F.R.D. 691, 699
(S.D.N.Y. 1975)). However, class counsel may also have an interest in obtaining the
information, as it can be helpful in assessing the strength of the class’s case. See Schwartz,
185 F.R.D. at 320 (noting that the questionnaire would assist both the defendant and class
counsel in discovery proceedings).
176. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1971)
(seeking discovery to prove a lack of liability).
177. See, e.g., Barham v. Ramsey, 246 F.R.D. 60, 63 (D.D.C. 2007) (seeking evidence
that would tend to disprove a constitutional violation by police during a mass arrest);
Schwartz, 185 F.R.D. at 315 (seeking evidence to disprove plaintiffs’ reliance claims).
178. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546,
1552 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that the trial court dismissed the employment class action after
many members failed to respond to discovery, because there was not sufficient numerosity).
But see Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 15 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (denying discovery because “the
delineation of appropriate classes is a question of law”).
179. See Madden & Paully, supra note 169, at 807. Such information may also be of
benefit to class counsel. See Schwartz, 185 F.R.D. at 320.
180. See infra Part II.A.
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members.181 In sum, absent member discovery could lead to a defendant
being unable to obtain a “bill of peace.”182
Two Rule 23 cases, one permitting absentee discovery and the other
denying it, illustrate how courts have grappled with the defendant’s need
for information and the absentees’ interest in not being burdened. In
Dellums v. Powell,183 demonstrators who had been arrested while protesting
the Vietnam War brought a Rule 23(b)(3) class action against the chief of
the capitol police, claiming false arrest, false imprisonment, and Fourth
Amendment violations.184 At trial, absent members gave testimony that
established that policemen beat the demonstrators while arresting them.185
On appeal, Powell, the chief of police, argued that the testimony was
improperly admitted because the FRCP did not permit discovery of absent
members.186 The D.C. Circuit surveyed case law pertaining to absentee
discovery.187 The court held that such discovery is permissible where the
requests are related to common questions, are made in good faith and not
unduly burdensome, and where the requested information is not available
from the representatives themselves.188 Further, the court noted that Powell
had the names of all the class members and could readily serve discovery
requests on the members.189 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision to admit the absent member testimony.190
By contrast, in Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp.,191 a district court found that
discovery of absent members is categorically impermissible.192 In
Wainwright, Georgia school boards brought a class action against milk
companies, alleging that the milk companies fixed prices in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.193 The milk companies served interrogatories and
document production requests on the school boards and then moved to
compel the school boards to answer.194 The district court denied the milk
companies’ motion and held that they would not be permitted to take
discovery of the absent members.195 The court reasoned that forcing the
absentees to respond would undermine the efficiency of Rule 23, essentially
making the class action a “massive joinder.”196 Further, the court held that
181. See supra text accompanying notes 16 and 17.
182. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
183. 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
184. See id. at 173–75.
185. See id. at 187. The testimony was intended to establish bad faith and malice on the
part of the police. See id. at 188.
186. See id. at 187.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
192. See id. at 534.
193. See id. at 533.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 535.
196. See id. at 534.
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absent members are not parties under Rule 23 and, therefore, are not subject
to party discovery rules.197
Among the courts that have permitted discovery in Rule 23 class actions,
there has been a split on the issue of which party should bear the cost.198
Some courts have ordered the defendant to pay,199 likely reasoning that the
defendant requested the discovery and therefore should bear the costs. One
court has ordered the defendant and plaintiffs’ counsel to split costs,
reasoning that the discovery benefitted both the plaintiff’s case and the
defendant’s case.200
While there has been dispute about whether to allow discovery of Rule
23 absentees, courts have generally agreed that discovery of FLSA
collective action plaintiffs is permissible.201 Unlike in Rule 23 class
actions, FLSA plaintiffs have chosen to opt into the action;202 accordingly,
subjecting those plaintiffs to discovery raises fewer concerns of coercion.
Additionally, the discovery phase is a crucial component in the second step
of the two-step process, because it allows the court to assess whether the
members are similarly situated with a higher level of scrutiny.203
Similarly to courts considering Rule 23 absent member discovery, state
courts also disagree on whether absent members can be subject to discovery
in state class actions.204 California state courts are the only state courts that
have considered in multiple cases whether absentees should be subject to
discovery.205 In California state class actions, defendants are sometimes
permitted to take discovery of absent members, but such discovery is not
permitted as a matter of course.206 Case law indicates that defendants in a
California state class action have a due process right to discovery from

197. See id. (explaining that absent members cannot be parties, because absent members
have the option of intervening or formally entering the class action). However, after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Devlin, it is clear that absent members can be parties. In that
case, the Supreme Court held that an absent member can be a party for some purposes,
depending on the procedural context of the litigation. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1,
9–10 (2002).
198. See Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 313, 319 (D. Colo. 1999)
(noting that some courts have held that the party seeking to serve a questionnaire must bear
the costs of the questionnaire).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 319–20; cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974)
(holding that the petitioner must bear the cost of notice to class members).
201. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
202. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
203. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
204. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(f) (“Unnamed members of a class action are not to be
considered as parties for purposes of discovery.”). But see Spoon v. Superior Court, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 44, 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (permitting absent member discovery).
205. See Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Absent or Unnamed Class Members in Class Action
in State Court As Subject to Discovery, 28 A.L.R. 4TH 986, § 1, at 987–93 (1984) (discussing
five California state court cases and one Louisiana state court case addressing the
permissibility of absent member discovery).
206. See Spoon, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
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absent members.207 Therefore, absent members are not automatically
immune from discovery requests.208 However, California state courts find
that discovery restrictions are necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the
Accordingly, the defendant must prove that the
class action.209
interrogatories concern matters that are necessary to the trial of class issues,
are not unduly burdensome on absentees, and will not foreseeably decrease
the class size.210
Alaska state courts have not yet ruled on whether and to what extent
absentees in Alaska state class actions are subject to discovery.211 In
International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v. Bissonette,212 the Alaska Supreme
Court surveyed federal case law regarding the permissibility of absent
member discovery.213 However, the Alaska Supreme Court did not endorse
or reject absent member discovery.214
E. Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions and State Discovery Sanctions
Courts draw on their federal or state sanction powers when imposing
sanctions on nonresponsive absent members.215 Accordingly, Part I.E
explores federal discovery sanctions as well as California and Alaska state
discovery sanctions. This section discusses the purpose of such sanctions
and the different kinds of permitted sanctions. Next, it considers the
standards by which courts analyze whether, and which, sanctions are
warranted.
Under the authority of Rule 37, federal courts can impose sanctions on
parties for failure to comply with discovery orders.216 Federal courts use
their Rule 37 authority to impose sanctions on absent members in Rule 23
class actions and FLSA collective actions when those members fail to
respond to discovery.217 Rule 37 discovery sanctions serve several
207. See id. at 51.
208. See id.
209. See Danzig v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. Rptr. 185, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (citing
Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62 F.R.D. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1973)) (explaining that the purpose of
class actions is to eliminate repetitive litigation and alleviate the participation burden on
absent class members).
210. See id. at 191.
211. See Appellees’ Brief at 42, Int’l Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v. Bissonette, 146 P.3d 561
(Alaska 2006) (No. S-11568), 2005 WL 3125938.
212. 146 P.3d 561 (Alaska 2006).
213. See id. at 568–69. The Alaska Supreme Court’s approach to absent member
discovery sanctions will be discussed in Part II.B.1.
214. See id.
215. See infra Part II.
216. FED. R. CIV. P. 37. Rule 37 is not the exclusive authority for discovery sanctions.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, any person who unreasonably delays court proceedings can be
required to pay costs and attorney’s fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006). Additionally, courts
possess common law sanction powers. See Olivieri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d
Cir. 1986) (discussing courts’ inherent powers to “supervise and control” court proceedings).
217. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 09-60073, 2011 WL 2729076, at
*4–7 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2011) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice
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purposes: they are a specific deterrent to the noncompliant party, a general
deterrent to others, and ensure that the noncompliant party will not benefit
from his or her failure to respond.218 However, courts must also take care
to ensure that a sanction is warranted, particularly when imposing the
harshest litigation-ending sanctions.219 Litigation-ending sanctions are
disfavored because they preclude resolution on the merits, thereby raising
due process concerns.220 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a
sanction must be fair and must be related to the claim that is at issue in the
discovery order.221 When deciding whether a sanction is fair, a court
analyzes a noncompliant party’s culpability and course of behavior in the
particular case.222
Given the fact-specific nature of sanction imposition, there is no rigid test
that dictates whether or which sanctions should be imposed.223 Rather,
courts are free to consider a number of factors.224 Courts have considered,
among other factors, the willfulness and bad faith of the party in not
complying with the order,225 the prejudice to the opposing party,226 whether
lesser sanctions would be effective,227 whether the noncompliant party was
warned of the sanction,228 and the policy favoring disposing of cases on the
merits.229
Under Rule 37(b), federal courts may impose the following sanctions, in
ascending order of severity, for failure to comply with court ordered
discovery: direct that facts related to matters in the discovery order be
taken as established for the purposes of the action; prohibit the
noncompliant party from presenting certain claims, defenses, or evidence;
nonresponsive FLSA party plaintiffs under Rule 37(b)); Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.,
Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC, 2011 WL 843956, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011) (granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice nonresponsive Rule 23 class members
under Rule 37(b)).
218. See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)
(noting that sanctions can serve as both a specific deterrent and a general deterrent); Update
Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1988).
219. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209–10 (1958).
220. See id. (noting that dismissal without a hearing of the merits implicates Fifth
Amendment due process problems).
221. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 707
(1982).
222. See id. at 707–08 (analyzing the noncompliant party’s behavior and concluding that
the trial court’s sanction—deeming jurisdictional facts established—was just).
223. See Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992).
224. See Joel Slawotsky, Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions—The Need for Supreme Court
Ordered Uniformity, 104 DICK. L. REV. 471, 500–01 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court
has not offered guidance on which factors courts should consider when imposing sanctions,
and suggesting that courts analyze eight factors in a balancing test).
225. See Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921.
229. See id.
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strike pleadings; stay proceedings until the discovery order is completed;
dismiss the action; render a default judgment; or hold a party in contempt of
court.230 In addition to or instead of these sanctions, courts can order the
noncompliant party and/or the attorney representing the noncompliant party
to pay expenses caused by the noncompliance, unless such an award would
be unjust.231 An award of expenses may be unjust if other severe sanctions
have already been imposed.232 Under Rule 37(d), a court can impose Rule
37(b) sanctions and/or expenses when a party fails to attend its own
deposition or answer interrogatories.233
The Supreme Court has held that courts should not dismiss with
prejudice when a party is unable to comply due to external factors.234
However, dismissal may be warranted if a party has not complied due to
willfulness, bad faith, or fault.235 The Supreme Court has explained that
when a party makes a good-faith effort to comply with discovery, due
process concerns weigh against dismissing the action.236
When dismissing a claim, a court can either dismiss the claim with
prejudice or without prejudice.237 Dismissal with prejudice extinguishes
the party’s claim forever;238 on the other hand, dismissal without prejudice
ends only the present litigation.239 A party dismissed without prejudice
may refile the same suit on the same claim.240

230. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)–(E).
231. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(E). Costs can be awarded for, among other things,
attorney’s fees for the cost of preparing or prosecuting a motion for sanctions. See, e.g.,
Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 29, 33 (D. Me. 1994) (awarding the fees and costs
associated with bringing a motion for compliance and a motion for sanctions).
232. See Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Sanctions Available Under Rule 37, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Other Than Exclusion of Expert Testimony, for Failure To Obey
Discovery Order Not Related to Expert Witness, 156 A.L.R. FED. 601, § 10[b], at 692
(1999).
233. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(1)(A), 37(d)(3).
234. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
235. See id. (holding that the district court erred in dismissing a Swiss holding company
with prejudice for its failure to produce bank documents, because the holding company could
not produce bank documents due to a conflict of laws).
236. See id. at 209 (“[T]here are constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even
in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause.”).
237. See Sharif v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 376 F.3d 720, 725 (7th Cir. 2004)
(comparing judicially created notice requirements for dismissal with prejudice and dismissal
without prejudice).
238. See Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Meade v.
Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1520 n.6 (10th Cir. 1988)).
239. See Sharif, 376 F.3d at 725.
240. See id. (noting that where there are statute of limitations problems, dismissal without
prejudice may have the same effect as dismissal without prejudice).
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A court can also exclude a noncompliant party from presenting evidence
in support of a particular claim or defense.241 This sanction is especially
appropriate when the noncompliant party frustrated discovery or when the
evidence obtained from discovery would be necessary to build a claim.242
Most courts have excluded evidence only when the noncompliant party has
acted in bad faith, or when the failure causes incurable prejudice because of
the due process concerns raised by the lack of evidence.243
Both California and Alaska state rules set forth discovery sanctions that
mirror the discovery sanctions set forth in Rule 37. Under Alaska’s Rule
37(b), a court can, among other sanctions, direct that facts be taken as
established for the purposes of the litigation, prohibit a party from
introducing evidence, strike out pleadings, or treat a party in contempt of
court.244 Similar to federal court powers, Alaska state courts can order the
noncompliant party to pay costs and fees, unless the failure was justified or
such an award would be unjust.245 California’s Code of Civil Procedure
authorizes courts to impose discovery sanctions under five categories:
monetary sanctions, issue sanctions, evidence sanctions, terminating
sanctions, and contempt sanctions.246
II. HARSH PUNISHMENT OR FAIR GAME?
SANCTIONING NONRESPONSIVE ABSENTEES
Part II discusses the decisions of courts that have considered whether,
and how, to sanction absent members for failure to respond to
postcertification discovery requests. First, this part explores the decisions
of courts that have dismissed noncompliant members with prejudice and
courts that have dismissed noncompliant members without prejudice. Next,
it considers the reasoning of courts that have refused to dismiss
noncompliant members. Finally, this part discusses the decisions of courts
that have imposed lesser sanctions: exclusion of evidence, exclusion of
new claims, and monetary sanctions.
Few courts have considered whether to impose discovery sanctions on
absentees.247 Accordingly, this section discusses the handful of leading
cases on the issue. Most courts agree that only willful or bad faith
misconduct on the part of absentees warrants imposing sanctions at all.248
241. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(B); Callwood v. Zurita, 158 F.R.D. 359, 362 (D.V.I.
1994) (prohibiting the defendant Attorney General, who violated four discovery orders, from
presenting evidence to disprove the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint).
242. See Slawotsky, supra note 224, at 484.
243. See id.
244. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 37(b), 37(d).
245. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(E).
246. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023.030 (West 2007).
247. Rydstrom, supra note 144, at 257.
248. See, e.g., Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding that dismissal for violation of discovery orders should be considered only if the
nonresponsive members acted in bad faith); Hernandez v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 09-
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Many courts have found that ignoring repeated requests for discovery
constitutes bad faith misconduct.249
A. Dismissal
Part II.A details the decisions of courts that have dismissed absent
members for failure to respond to discovery requests. First, this section
discusses the decisions of courts that have dismissed nonresponsive
members with prejudice. Second, it discusses the decisions of courts that
have dismissed nonresponsive members without prejudice. Finally, Part
II.A explores the decisions of courts that have declined to dismiss
nonresponsive members.
1. Extinguishing Absent Member Claims Forever:
Dismissal with Prejudice
Courts rarely invoke dismissal with prejudice. There are three leading
cases in which courts have done so.250 Out of those three cases, only one
case is an opt-out class action; the other two cases are opt-in class
actions.251 Because opt-in absent members have affirmatively opted into
the class, and thus are more like real parties, a failure to respond shows
greater bad faith in opt-in class actions than it does in opt-out class
actions.252
The cases that order dismissal with prejudice reflect bad-faith misconduct
on the part of the absent members.253 In Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Insurance Co.254 and Hernandez v. Starbucks Coffee Co.,255 the
noncompliant members each received three warnings before the court
contemplated dismissal.256 In Estrada v. RPS, Inc.,257 the absent members

60073, 2011 WL 2729076, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2011) (assessing whether the absentees
acted in bad faith when ignoring three court orders); Arleth v. FMP Operating Co., Civ.A.
No. 90-1663, 1991 WL 211521, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 1991) (denying dismissal of the
nonresponsive members, in part because the members did not act in bad faith).
249. See, e.g., Hernandez, 2011 WL 2729076, at *7 n.7 (finding that failure to comply
with three court orders is evidence of willfulness and bad faith); Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores,
Inc., Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC, 2011 WL 843956, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011)
(noting that ignoring discovery requests and warnings is evidence of willfulness, bad faith,
and fault).
250. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971);
Hernandez, 2011 WL 2729076; Estrada v. RPS, Inc., No. BC210130, 2003 WL 25715846
(Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003), appeal dismissed, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 267–68 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005).
251. See infra notes 259–90 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 278, 288 and accompanying text.
253. See infra notes 262, 276, 288 and accompanying text.
254. 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971).
255. No. 09-60073, 2011 WL 2729076 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2011).
256. See infra notes 262, 273 and accompanying text.
257. No. BC210130, 2003 WL 25715846 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003).
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acted in bad faith by refusing to respond to a questionnaire after they had
already been in contact with class counsel.258
In Brennan, the Seventh Circuit dismissed absent members with
prejudice from a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out securities fraud class action.259 The
plaintiffs alleged that Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. committed
securities fraud by aiding and abetting a securities dealer who never
delivered the stock that the plaintiffs purchased.260 The trial court had
permitted the defendant to serve interrogatories on the absentees for two
purposes: to determine the amount of each member’s claim and to obtain
information to prove that it was not liable.261 Many members failed to
respond, even after class counsel sent a reminder letter and two warning
Consequently, upon the
letters to the nonresponsive members.262
defendant’s motion, the district court dismissed the nonresponsive
absentees with prejudice.263 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal,
reasoning that dismissal with prejudice was a permissible sanction because
it compels response.264 However, the court recognized that dismissal of
absent members is a “drastic” sanction; the members took no affirmative
action and were represented by the named plaintiff, but their claims would
be extinguished forever.265 Yet the Seventh Circuit found that dismissal
with prejudice was warranted because the noncompliant members ignored
multiple warnings.266
Two courts have dismissed absent members with prejudice in opt-in class
actions.267 In Hernandez, a district court held that nonresponsive members
in a FLSA action can be dismissed with prejudice, but only after the
members have been warned that noncompliance could result in dismissal.268
The plaintiffs argued that the class members were improperly classified as
store managers who were exempt from overtime pay.269 After certification,
the defendant served three interrogatories and four document requests on
the absent members.270 The requests sought information relating to the
employees’ resumes and job applications after working at Starbucks, as

258. See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
259. See Brennan, 450 F.2d at 1001, 1006.
260. See id. at 1001.
261. See id. at 1005.
262. See id. at 1002.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 1004–05.
265. See id. at 1003–04; see also id. at 1004 n.2 (noting that, while exclusion from the
class may be an appropriate remedy in many cases, the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion by dismissing the members in this case).
266. See id. at 1004 n.2.
267. See infra notes 268–90 and accompanying text.
268. See Hernandez v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 09-60073, 2011 WL 2729076, at *6
(S.D. Fla. June 22, 2011).
269. See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Reed v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 0960073 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2009), 2009 WL 3488645.
270. See Hernandez, 2011 WL 2729076, at *1.
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well as any previous testimony about working for Starbucks.271 Starbucks
sought to use the evidence at trial and in support of its motion to decertify
the class.272 Out of 732 members, 376 members failed to respond for
nearly a year despite three orders requesting a response.273 The court
decided to give the nonresponsive members a final written warning, but
planned to dismiss the members with prejudice if they still failed to
respond.274
Like the Brennan court, the Hernandez court was influenced by the fact
that the absent members refused to respond to three warnings.275 The court
found that the noncompliant members acted in willful bad faith when they
failed to respond to the three court orders.276 However, the Hernandez
court distinguished opt-in FLSA actions from opt-out actions.277 The court
explained that the defendant is presumed to be prejudiced when opt-in
absentees fail to respond to class wide discovery.278 The court’s finding of
prejudice supported the court’s finding that the members acted willfully and
in bad faith.279
In Estrada, pick-up and delivery drivers sought damages for unpaid labor
expenses in a California state class action.280 The plaintiffs claimed that
they were improperly classified as independent contractors, and thus were
entitled to repayment of expenses incurred during their work.281
Functionally, Estrada was an opt-in class action because the absent
members had to respond to a conditional certification questionnaire to be
considered for inclusion in the class action.282 After defining the class, the
court ordered that another questionnaire be sent to the absent members.283
The second questionnaire was intended to gather evidence relating to
damages and the issue of whether the plaintiffs were employees or
independent contractors.284 Ultimately, the court dismissed with prejudice
the members who did not respond to the second questionnaire.285
271. See id. at *2. Starbucks requested information about the employees’ subsequent job
applications because it sought information about how the employees described their job
duties.
272. See id. at *1–2.
273. See id. at *2.
274. See id. at *6.
275. See supra notes 262–64, 273 and accompanying text.
276. See Hernandez, 2011 WL 2729076, at *6.
277. See id. at *5.
278. See id. (citing Colozzi v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. Ctr., No. 5:08-CV-1220 (DNH/DEP),
2010 WL 3433997, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 20, 2010)).
279. See id. at *5–6.
280. See Estrada v. RPS, Inc., No. BC210130, 2003 WL 25715846 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct.
17, 2003), appeal dismissed, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261, 267–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
281. See id.
282. See id. The first questionnaire was intended to ascertain whether the potential
members fit the class definition. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See id.
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Like the Brennan court and the Hernandez court, the Estrada court was
influenced by the members’ bad-faith refusal to respond.286 The Estrada
members’ nonresponse was in bad faith because they had previously been
in contact with class counsel when answering the conditional class
certification questionnaire.287 Additionally, like the Hernandez court, the
Estrada court explicitly found that the members’ willful refusal to respond
prejudiced the defendant employer.288 The defendant was prejudiced
because the requested information directly involved the issues of the
case.289 Further, the members’ refusal to respond deprived the employer of
its due process right to discovery under California law.290
2. Giving Absent Members a Break: Dismissal Without Prejudice
This subsection analyzes the two leading decisions in which courts have
ordered dismissal of absentees without prejudice. Both decisions reflect
concern for the absent members’ due process rights.291 Showing concern
for the noncompliant members’ right to be heard, the Cruz court allowed
individual members to continue with their claims by ordering dismissal
without prejudice and tolling the statute of limitations.292 The Cruz court
ordered dismissal because the members acted in bad faith, there was
prejudice to the defendant, and lesser sanctions would have been
ineffective.293 In his Brennan dissent, then-Judge John Paul Stevens argued
that the nonresponsive absentees should be dismissed as a matter of
procedure, because their interests diverged from the interests of the
representative when they failed to respond to the interrogatories.294 Thus,
the nonresponsive members were not adequately represented, and the court
lacked power to bind them in judgment.295
In Cruz, a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out employment class action, the plaintiffs
alleged that their employment status was improperly classified.296 As a
result, defendant Dollar Tree Stores failed to pay overtime wages and
provide rest and meal breaks.297 Dollar Tree Stores served document
requests and interrogatories that were related to the class members’ work

286. See id.; supra notes 262, 276 and accompanying text.
287. See Estrada, 2003 WL 25715846.
288. See id.; supra note 278 and accompanying text.
289. See Estrada, 2003 WL 25715846.
290. See id.; supra note 207 and accompanying text.
291. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1006–07 (7th Cir.
1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012
SC, 2011 WL 843956, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011).
292. See Cruz, 2011 WL 843956, at *6. The court noted that this solution ameliorated the
Wainwright court’s due process concerns. See id.
293. See infra notes 303–18 and accompanying text.
294. See infra notes 319–24 and accompanying text.
295. See infra notes 319–24 and accompanying text.
296. See Cruz, 2011 WL 843956, at *1.
297. See id.
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hours and job responsibilities.298 After many class members failed to
respond, the class members were mailed two letters warning of casedispositive sanctions.299 Concerned with the right to be heard, the court
dismissed the nonresponsive members without prejudice and tolled the
statute of limitations as to those members.300 Further, the Cruz court
declined to dismiss members whose final warning letters were returned as
undeliverable.301 The court reasoned that dismissing these members would
be unfair because they never had a final opportunity to respond.302
The court used the Ninth Circuit’s five-part test to assess whether a caseending sanction was warranted and then surveyed case law pertaining to
absent member dismissal.303 The court found that four of the five factors—
the public’s interest in resolution, the court’s need to manage its docket,
prejudice to the defendant, and the effectiveness of lesser sanctions—
supported dismissal.304 The factor favoring the resolution of cases on the
merits did not support dismissal.305
Additionally, the Cruz court found that Brennan was persuasive authority
in support of dismissal and that Wainwright was unpersuasive.306
Following the reasoning of Brennan, the Cruz court found that Dollar Tree
Stores did not use the interrogatories as a tactic to scare or confuse class
members.307 Further, the court ameliorated the due process problems that
concerned the Wainwright court by allowing members to continue
individually with their claims.308
The Cruz court found that Dollar Tree Stores would be prejudiced if the
nonresponsive members’ claims were not dismissed.309 Without the
discovery responses, it would be difficult for Dollar Tree Stores to identify
which class members best supported its case.310 Accordingly, Dollar Tree
Stores would be disadvantaged when determining which members to call as

298. See Defendant Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.’s Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss
Claims of Class Members Who Failed To Respond to Defendant’s Discovery; Memorandum
of Points & Authorities (Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 37) at 10, Cruz, Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC,
2010 WL 7368356. The interrogatories sought information about the amount of time that
the members worked each week, the amount of the time that the members engaged in various
work-related tasks, the members’ job duty certifications, and the members’ rest and meal
breaks. See id.
299. See Cruz, 2011 WL 843956, at *1–2.
300. See supra notes 291–92 and accompanying text.
301. See Cruz, 2011 WL 843956, at *3–4.
302. See id. at *3.
303. See id. at *3–8.
304. See id. at *4.
305. See id.
306. See id. at *5–6.
307. See id. at *6.
308. See id.; see also Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
309. See Cruz, 2011 WL 843956, at *4.
310. See id.
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adverse or rebuttal witnesses.311 Further, some of the outstanding discovery
responses could potentially be useful to Dollar Tree Stores’ experts.312
Additionally, lesser sanctions would be ineffective.313
Monetary
sanctions would not ameliorate Dollar Tree Stores’ prejudice and would be
impossible to collect from absentees.314 Claim preclusion of the discoveryrelated claims would be tantamount to dismissal, because the requested
discovery concerned all of the members’ claims.315
Finally, the Cruz court found the absentees’ behavior to be in bad
faith.316 The court noted that the Ninth Circuit has held that dismissal is
justified only where the party’s behavior has shown “willfulness, bad faith,
and fault.”317 The nonresponsive members had acted in bad faith because
they had ignored multiple warning letters.318
In his Brennan dissent, then-Judge Stevens focused on the court’s
jurisdictional power to bind the absent members.319 He argued that
nonresponsive members should be excluded from the class because of their
right to adequate representation.320 Citing Hansberry v. Lee,321 Judge
Stevens explained that a litigant can represent absent parties only to the
extent that the litigant and the absent parties’ interests align.322 Judge
Stevens reasoned that the nonresponding absent members had some interest
in not revealing the information requested in the interrogatories and that this
interest put them outside the class represented by the named plaintiff.323 He
concluded that the nonresponsive members should have had a choice to
request exclusion from the class as an alternative to responding to the
interrogatories.324
3. Disadvantaging the Defendant: Dismissal Is Not Warranted
This subsection analyzes the reasoning of courts that have declined to
dismiss absent members for failure to respond to discovery requests. It first

311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See id. at *5.
317. See id. at *3 (citing Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482
F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007)).
318. See id. at *5.
319. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1006–07 (7th Cir.
1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
320. Judge Stevens found that dismissal with prejudice would create serious
representation problems. See id. at 1007. Note, however, that the Cruz court implicitly
condoned dismissal with prejudice. See Cruz, 2011 WL 843956, at *4 (“The Court notes that
it is not imposing the most severe sanction available.”).
321. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
322. See Brennan, 450 F.2d at 1006–07.
323. See id. at 1007.
324. See id.
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examines whether sanctions lesser than dismissal can be appropriate and
whether discovery requests coupled with a threat of dismissal can
intimidate absent members. Then, it examines the bad-faith requirement.
Finally, it considers whether dismissal of absent members creates an opt-in
scheme.
Dismissal is one of the harshest sanctions because it is litigation
ending.325 Consequently, plaintiffs argue that courts should impose lesser
sanctions on noncompliant members, if lesser sanctions are available.326 In
Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,327 a Rule 23(b)(2) employment sex
discrimination action, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court’s
decision dismissing members who did not respond to interrogatories.328
The Cox court found that the trial judge did not consider lesser sanctions,
and stated that there is an abuse of discretion if lesser sanctions would have
sufficed.329
Similarly, in Wouters v. Martin County330 an FLSA collective action
brought by emergency medical service personnel to recover overtime pay,
the Eleventh Circuit found that a lesser sanction was available and reversed
the dismissal of noncompliant members.331 At the trial level, the defendant
had requested the award of attorney’s fees to cover the cost of preparation
for the motion to dismiss, but the trial court had dismissed the noncompliant
plaintiffs instead.332 Because a lesser sanction was available, dismissal was
inappropriate.333
Courts have shown concern that the threat of a sanction as severe as
dismissal can intimidate class members.334 A dismissal order can
potentially reduce the class size and thereby undermine the Rule 23 policy
that all members are included unless they request exclusion.335 In Easton &
Co. v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co.,336 a securities fraud class action,
325. See supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text.
326. See Wouters v. Martin Cnty., 9 F.3d 924, 933–34 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Ford v.
Fogarty Van Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1582, 1583 (11th Cir.1986)); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Ford v. Fogarty Van Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d
1582, 1583 (11th Cir.1986)). But see Int’l Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v. Bissonette, 146 P.3d
561, 569 (Alaska 2006) (noting that, while the trial judge chose to impose the less severe
sanction of excluding evidence, the judge could have imposed a harsher sanction).
327. 784 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986).
328. Id. at 1556–57. There was no evidence that the members even received the
discovery requests. See Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants Preference at 24, Cox, 784 F.2d
1546 (Nos. 84-7382, 84-7462), 1985 WL 670612.
329. Cox, 784 F.2d at 1556.
330. 9 F.3d 924 (11th Cir. 1993).
331. See id. at 934.
332. See id. at 933–34.
333. See id. at 934.
334. See Easton & Co. v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., Nos. 91-4012 (HLS), 92-2095
(HLS), 1994 WL 248172, at *5 (D.N.J. May 18, 1994); Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n,
67 F.R.D. 691, 700–01 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
335. See Easton, 1994 WL 248172, at *5.
336. Nos. 91-4012 (HLS), 92-2095 (HLS), 1994 WL 248172 (D.N.J. May 18, 1994).
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the district court expressed concern that members might be intimidated by
an interrogatory request warning of potential dismissal sanctions.337
Ultimately, the court permitted the defendant to serve discovery on the
absentees.338 However, the court ordered the defendant to redraft the
interrogatory request to eliminate a warning of dismissal.339 Similarly, in
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass’n,340 a mandatory 23(b)(1) class
action, the court stipulated that discovery would not be enforced with the
threat of dismissal.341 The court explained that it had a duty to protect
absentees from harassment.342
The Eleventh Circuit has declined to dismiss absentees when there is no
showing of bad faith on the part of the absentees.343 In both Cox and
Wouters, the Eleventh Circuit held that dismissal requires a showing of
willful bad faith.344 In Cox, the Eleventh Circuit refused to affirm the trial
court’s dismissal order, because the trial court neglected to make a finding
of bad faith.345 Similarly, in Wouters, the court reversed the dismissal of
the noncompliant members because there was no finding of bad faith by the
trial court.346
Plaintiffs argue that dismissing noncompliant members in an opt-out
action creates an opt-in action, which reduces efficiency and is inconsistent
with the policies of Rule 23.347 As discussed in Part I, one of the purposes
of Rule 23 is to enhance efficiency.348 By encompassing all members who
did not request exclusion, opt-out class actions decrease the number of
actions that will be brought on the same claim.349 Plaintiffs argue that
requiring absent members to respond to discovery creates an opt-in action,
because the members have to take an affirmative action to remain in the
class.350 Requiring such affirmative action is contrary to the allencompassing rationale of Rule 23.351 Further, forcing plaintiffs to respond
or be dismissed is contrary to the Supreme Court’s view of the passive role
337. See id. at *5.
338. See id. at *6.
339. See id. at *5 (explaining that there is no need to consider the sanction of dismissal
when there is not yet any evidence that the members would not respond).
340. 67 F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
341. See id. at 699–701.
342. See id. The court also noted that any discussion of dismissal would be academic,
because the class action was mandatory. See id. at 701.
343. See Wouters v. Martin Cnty., 9 F.3d 924, 934 (11th Cir. 1993); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir. 1986).
344. See Wouters, 9 F.3d at 934 (citing Cox, 784 F.2d at 1556).
345. See Cox, 784 F.2d at 1556.
346. See Wouters, 9 F.3d at 934.
347. See, e.g., Cox, 784 F.2d at 1557; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 16, 172 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., Cox, 784 F.2d at 1557 (explaining that requiring members to respond to
discovery in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action effectively makes the class action an opt-in class
action).
351. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
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of absent members.352 By forcing a member to choose between dismissal
and response, that member is no longer “not required to do anything . . . .
[but] sit back and allow the litigation to run its course.”353
In Cox, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that dismissal of noncompliant
absentees is contrary to the opt-out scheme of Rule 23.354 The Cox court
noted that the Rule 23 advisory committee specifically rejected an opt-in
approach.355 Further, requiring an affirmative action may intimidate
members, effectively “freezing” out their claims.356 If absentees’ claims
are frozen, it follows that total class action damages awards will decrease
(assuming that the members do not continue their claims individually).357
Courts have also considered whether dismissal creates an opt-in scheme
when deciding whether to permit discovery in the first place.358 In Kline v.
First Western Government Securities, Inc.,359 a securities fraud action, the
court denied the defendant’s motion to serve discovery on absentees.360
The court explained that serving discovery and then filing a motion to
dismiss nonresponsive members was a “back door” way to create an opt-in
action.361 By creating a choice between response or dismissal, such a
scheme would force absentees to opt in or be excluded.362 On the other
hand, in Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc.,363 a Rule 23(b)(3) securities
class action, a district court permitted the defendant to serve discovery on
absent members.364 However, the court found that a potential motion to
dismiss would create an opt-in class action, and therefore decided to make
the questionnaire optional.365
B. Considering Other Options: Exclusion of Evidence, Estoppel of
New Claims, and Monetary Sanctions
Part II.B discusses the decisions of courts that have imposed sanctions
lesser than dismissal on noncompliant absentees. Diligent research has
352. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985).
353. See id.
354. See Cox, 784 F.2d at 1556–57.
355. See id. at 1557.
356. See id. (citing Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397–98
(1967)).
357. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
358. See, e.g., Kline v. First W. Gov’t Secs., Inc., No. CIV.A. 83-1076, 1996 WL 122717,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1996).
359. No. CIV.A. 83-1076, 1996 WL 122717 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1996).
360. See id. at *1.
361. See id. at *2.
362. See id.
363. 185 F.R.D. 313 (D. Colo. 1999).
364. See id. at 319. The interrogatory sought information about the members’ purchase
and sale of the stock at issue, in what capacity the members were stockholders, and what
resources the members used when deciding to purchase the stock. See id. at 317.
365. See id. at 319 (changing the language of the questionnaire to communicate that a
response is encouraged, but not mandatory).
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shown that few courts have considered imposing sanctions other than
dismissal on absentees. Accordingly, this section discusses four leading
cases in which courts considered imposing alternative sanctions. This
section analyzes a decision affirming the exclusion of evidence, a decision
excluding new claims, and two decisions discussing monetary sanctions.
1. Exclusion of Evidence
In International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc., the Alaska Supreme Court
affirmed a trial court’s order excluding any evidence provided by
nonresponsive members.366 In that case, a class of commercial salmon
fishers alleged that the defendant fish buyer promised to pay a more
competitive price on salmon than what it had actually paid.367 The fish
buyer served two interrogatories on absentees to determine what documents
or statements the class members relied on in believing that the defendant
owed them a higher price per pound.368 When many members failed to
respond, the fish buyer moved to dismiss the nonresponsive members
without prejudice.369 The trial court declined to dismiss the members,
noting that dismissal is the harshest sanction.370 Instead, the trial court
limited the evidence that the plaintiffs could produce at trial to the evidence
that was provided by the responding class members during discovery.371
This precluded the noncompliant members from testifying or offering
evidence at trial.372 On appeal, the defendant argued that the sanction was
meaningless, because the nonresponsive members were not participating in
the case and thus were never going to offer evidence or testify.373 At the
same time, those members increase the contingency fee for plaintiffs’
counsel because they would still be eligible for money damages.374
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude
evidence.375 The court recognized the noncompliant members’ interest in
not being unduly punished, citing Brennan.376 However, the court also
noted that a harsher sanction would have been within the judge’s
discretion.377

366. See Int’l Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v. Bissonette, 146 P.3d 561, 562 (Alaska 2006).
367. See id. at 563.
368. See Brief of Appellant at 14, Int’l Seafoods of Alaska, Inc., 146 P.3d 561 (No. S11568), 2005 WL 1550881.
369. See Int’l Seafoods of Alaska, Inc., 146 P.3d at 568.
370. See id. at 568–69.
371. See id. at 569.
372. See id. at 565.
373. See Brief of Appellant at 50–54, Int’l Seafoods of Alaska, Inc., 146 P.3d 561 (No. S11568), 2005 WL 1550881.
374. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
375. See Int’l Seafoods of Alaska, Inc., 146 P.3d at 569.
376. See id. at 568–69.
377. See id. at 569.
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2. Estoppel of New Claims
In Arleth v. FMP Operating Co.,378 stockholders sued the issuing
corporation and its successor in interest for securities fraud.379 The court
denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss absentees who failed to respond to
interrogatories concerning evidence of reliance.380 However, the court
estopped the nonresponsive members from raising new claims or rights.381
The court found that dismissal was an overly harsh sanction and that the
defendants had not proven that this harsh sanction was warranted.382
Further, the court explained that it had a duty to protect the absent members
and to give them their day in court.383 Yet, the court recognized the
defendants’ concern that the nonresponsive members might unfairly
surprise the defendant by raising new claims after discovery had
concluded.384 Accordingly, the court estopped nonresponsive members
from raising new claims or rights.385
3. Monetary Sanctions
In Wouters, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of noncompliant
members after finding that a monetary sanction would have sufficed.386 At
the trial level, some members had failed to respond to a set of
interrogatories.387 Consequently, the defendant requested the award of
attorney’s fees for the cost of preparation of the motion to dismiss.388
However, the trial court rejected the request and instead dismissed the
noncompliant plaintiffs.389 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with
class counsel that the absent members’ nonresponse did not prejudice the
defendant.390 After the interrogatories had been delivered, the defendant
had deposed each class member and obtained full answers to the
interrogatory questions.391
The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred when it rejected
the lesser sanction of attorney’s fees and dismissed the noncompliant

378. No. 90-1663, 1991 WL 211521 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 1991).
379. Id. at *1.
380. See Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 32, Arleth v. Freeport-McMoran Oil &
Gas Co., 2 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-03313), 1993 WL 13129218.
381. See Arleth, 1991 WL 211521, at *5.
382. See id. at *5–6 (finding that the defendants had not shown an urgent need for the
information or bad faith on the part of the nonresponsive members).
383. See id. at *6.
384. See id. at *5.
385. See id.
386. See Wouters v. Martin Cnty., 9 F.3d 924, 934 (11th Cir. 1993).
387. See id. at 933.
388. See id. at 934.
389. See id.
390. See id. at 933–34.
391. See id. at 933.
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plaintiffs.392 As such, the Eleventh Circuit implied that monetary sanctions
would have been appropriate. Further, the court stated that the decision did
not preclude the district court’s ability to impose lesser sanctions against the
plaintiff or plaintiffs’ attorney.393
By contrast, in Cruz, a district court found that monetary sanctions are
neither feasible nor practical.394 In that case, the court considered imposing
monetary sanctions on nonresponsive absentees but decided that the
monetary sanctions would be difficult to collect and would not lessen the
prejudice to the defendant.395 The Cruz court did not address the issue of
monetary sanctions against class counsel.396
III. DISCOVERING A BALANCE: SANCTIONS SHOULD DEPEND ON THE TYPE
OF GROUP LITIGATION
In Part III, this Note endorses a solution that combines the reasoning of
Hernandez and Cruz. This solution best balances defendants’ and
plaintiffs’ interests because it takes into account the type of class action, the
degree of prejudice to the defendant, and the level of bad faith on the part of
the absentees. Part III first sets guidelines for ordering discovery of
absentees. Then, it describes the solution and assess problems with it.
Finally, it addresses an implication of the solution.
A. Guidelines for Absentee Discovery
Postcertification discovery of absentee members should continue to be a
rare occurrence in Rule 23 class actions and state class actions, because
such discovery is contrary to the general policy that absentee members need
not participate in class actions.397 Courts should continue to assess whether
discovery is warranted by analyzing whether the requested discovery is
appropriate in that particular litigation, the defendant’s need for the
information, and the potential burden on the absent members.398 Discovery
requests are appropriate only where they relate to common issues and where
the information is unavailable from the representative parties.399 Courts
should deny complicated or technical discovery requests because such
requests may confuse absentees.400 By confusing absentees, those requests
may discourage absentees from remaining in the action.401

392. See id. at 934.
393. See id.
394. See Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Nos. 07-2050 SC, 07-4012 SC, 2011 WL
843956, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011).
395. See id.
396. See id.
397. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
401. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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Absentee discovery in FLSA collective actions is common and is an
exception to the general rule that courts should not order absentee
discovery.402 In FLSA collective actions, members are required to
affirmatively opt in and discovery is a crucial component of the two-step
process.403 Accordingly, discovery requests are less suspect in these
actions because the “party plaintiffs” are more like real parties.404
Although courts have broad power to order discovery in FLSA cases,405
courts should order discovery only to the extent necessary and should
consider the burden on the party plaintiffs.
B. The Hernandez/Cruz Solution
By implementing these procedures, courts will rarely have to consider
whether to sanction noncompliant absentees. However, if a court must
reach this issue, the court should first send a warning to the absentees.406
The warning should include a response deadline407 and inform the
noncompliant absentees of the possible range of sanctions for continued
nonresponse.408
While a warning might intimidate some members,409 it also might
encourage response. More importantly, though, a court-issued warning will
alleviate or forestall due process problems by giving the absentees notice of
potential sanctions,410 while protecting their right to their day in court.411
If the absentees still fail to respond after a warning, the court can begin to
assess whether dismissal of the noncompliant absentees is warranted. First,
the court should consider whether the action is an opt-in class action or an
opt-out class action.412 Generally, courts should dismiss opt-out members
without prejudice and dismiss opt-in members with prejudice. As the
Hernandez court explained, an absentee’s failure to respond demonstrates
greater bad faith in an opt-in class action than in an opt-out class action.413
In an opt-in class action, the members have affirmatively shown interest in
the action and thus are more like real parties.414 Accordingly, when opt-in
members fail to respond (assuming receipt of the discovery request), they

402. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 86, 101–02 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
406. Both the Hernandez and Cruz courts issued warnings to nonresponsive absentees.
See supra notes 268, 299 and accompanying text.
407. Warning letters typically have a deadline for response after which the members are
considered nonresponsive. See supra notes 268, 299 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 273–74, 299 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 341–42 and accompanying text.
410. See supra Part I.C.
411. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
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are willfully ignoring the request.415 Such ignorance is grounds for a court
to make a finding of bad faith.416
By contrast, an opt-out member’s nonresponse could indicate either a
lack of interest, nonreceipt of the request,417 or willful bad faith. It is
difficult for a court to discern which of the three motivations underlies an
opt-out member’s nonresponse. Accordingly, a court should not generally
impose the harshest sanction on opt-out members, but should instead
dismiss opt-out members without prejudice.
Further, if an opt-out member’s discovery request or warning letter is
returned as undeliverable, the court should decline to dismiss that
member.418 As the Cruz court explained, members who do not receive a
final warning letter do not receive a final opportunity to respond.419
Similarly, members who do not receive an initial discovery request are
never informed that their participation was required. Because these
members never received such notice, it would be a violation of their due
process rights to dismiss them.420
Next, the court should consider the degree of prejudice that the defendant
has suffered due to the absentees’ nonresponse.421 Because courts should
order absentee discovery only where the information is necessary to the
defendant’s claims or defenses,422 nonresponse will usually result in great
prejudice to the defendant. If the discovery is necessary, there are grounds
Accordingly, if the defendant is greatly
for harsher sanctions.423
prejudiced, a court can consider ordering dismissal with prejudice.424
However, courts should be more reluctant to order dismissal with prejudice
in an opt-out class action, because it is usually unclear whether the
absentees have acted in bad faith.425
Finally, if the action is an opt-in class action, the court should take into
account the level of bad faith on the part of the absent members, as the
Hernandez court did.426 Courts should analyze the level of the absentees’
bad faith by considering how many warnings the absent members have
ignored and for how long they have ignored them.427 If the opt-in absentees
have ignored multiple warnings and/or not complied for a long period of
time, the court should order dismissal with prejudice.428 As part of the first
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

See supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 301–02 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 301–02 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 301–02 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra notes 226, 289 and accompanying text.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 226, 289 and accompanying text.
See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
See supra note 275–76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 266, 273–76 and accompanying text.
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step of this solution, the court will have already sent at least one warning.429
Failure to respond to this warning and any subsequent warnings (assuming
the warnings were received), demonstrates bad faith on the part of the
absent members.430
Because evidence of bad faith is often difficult to establish in opt-out
class actions, dismissal with prejudice generally will not be warranted in
such actions. In opt-out class actions, it is difficult to discern the
motivation behind an absentee’s nonresponse.431 Accordingly, courts will
often be unable to assess whether such members have acted in bad faith at
all.432 Given that evidence of bad faith is necessary for dismissal with
prejudice,433 courts should not dismiss opt-out members with prejudice.
To summarize, noncompliant absentees in opt-out actions should usually
be dismissed without prejudice, and noncompliant absentees in opt-in
actions should usually be dismissed with prejudice.434 However, a court
can impose a harsher sanction on opt-out absentees if the defendant has
been severely prejudiced by those absentees’ failure to respond.435 If the
action is an opt-in class action and the absentees have acted with a high
level of bad faith, the court should order dismissal with prejudice.436
C. Problems with the Hernandez/Cruz Solution
Absent members will argue that this solution undercuts the accepted
passive role of absent members,437 creates an opt-in action for opt-out
members,438 and gives defendants a tactical mechanism with which to
eliminate class members.439 Class action advocates will argue that this
solution undermines the efficiency of class actions because it does not lead
to a defendant obtaining a bill of peace.440 This Note discusses and rebuts
each argument, in turn.
First, opponents will argue that dismissing absentees distorts the passive
role that the Supreme Court has envisioned for absent members.441
Absentees will argue that creating a choice between response and dismissal
forces them to be active in a class action.442 However, any sanction lesser
than dismissal will not meaningfully ameliorate the prejudice that the

429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.

See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 276, 318 and accompanying text.
See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 223–29, 343 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 412–20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 421–24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 426–32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 352–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 347–51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163, 168 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 352–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 21–23, 353 and accompanying text.
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defendant has suffered from nonresponse.443 As previously discussed,
discovery requests should be propounded only when the information is
necessary to the defendant’s claims or defenses.444 It follows that the
defendant suffers prejudice when the absentees fail to provide such
necessary information.445
Imposing a meaningful sanction is paramount when weighing the
defendant’s interest in the information against the members’ interest in
maintaining a passive role.446 Monetary sanctions against class counsel,
exclusion of new claims, or exclusion of the nonresponsive members’
evidence will not ameliorate the defendant’s prejudice.447 Monetary
sanctions against nonresponsive class members will not ameliorate the
defendant’s prejudice and are nearly impossible to collect.448 These
solutions do not cure the defendant’s prejudice because the nonresponsive
members are still included in the action.449 On the other hand, an order of
dismissal will meaningfully ameliorate a defendant’s prejudice because the
nonresponsive members causing the prejudice will be excluded from the
action.450
Second, absentees will argue that dismissing opt-out members without
prejudice in Rule 23 class actions creates an opt-in action that undermines
the efficiency of Rule 23.451 Although dismissing opt-out members without
prejudice undermines the efficiency of a particular case,452 such dismissal
will not undermine the efficiency of Rule 23 class actions as a whole.
Discovery of absent members is rarely permitted because of the strict
standards for such discovery,453 and thus, absentee exclusion will be rare.454
Therefore, class actions will remain an efficient mechanism that facilitates
resolution of many similar claims.
Third, absent members will argue that permitting dismissal of absentees
gives defendants a tactical tool that can potentially reduce class size.455
This concern is unfounded because courts should deny any discovery
request that is intended to decrease class size.456 A court’s initial analysis
of whether to permit discovery will eliminate any tactical uses of absentee
discovery.457
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

See supra notes 314, 373 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160–64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 278, 288–89 and accompanying text.
See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B; supra note 374 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 373–74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 347–51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160–64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160–64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163, 168 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, class action advocates will argue that ordering dismissal of optout absentees without prejudice deprives defendants of a “bill of peace.”458
When absentees are dismissed without prejudice, defendants could be
subject to repetitive, individual suits.459 However, concern for absentees’
due process rights outweigh defendants’ need for a bill of peace. As
previously discussed, the motivation behind an opt-out member’s
nonresponse is unclear.460 Because an opt-out absentee may not have
received the discovery request, dismissal could be without notice to that
absentee.461 As such, absentee dismissal implicates due process concerns
about notice and the right to be heard.462 Dismissal without prejudice
forestalls or ameliorates these due process problems because it allows an
absentee to continue pursuing a claim.463
The proposed solution has implications for the Rule 23(b)(3)(A)
requirement that courts assess the class members’ interest in individually
controlling the prosecution of their claim.464 Absentees may refuse to
respond to a discovery request because they lack interest in the claims465 or
wish to bring their claims individually.466 A lack of response may indicate
that the absentees want to individually control the litigation and would
prefer that a class action not be maintained on their behalf. Accordingly, if
many absentees fail to respond to discovery requests, there may be grounds
for a court to decertify a class.467
CONCLUSION
Courts are in disagreement about whether dismissal is an appropriate
sanction when absentees fail to respond to postcertification discovery
requests. This issue implicates due process concerns and raises questions
about the role, rights, and duties of absent members. Courts should strive to
impose a sanction that ameliorates the defendant’s prejudice while
recognizing absent members’ due process rights.
Courts should dismiss nonresponsive absentees because dismissal is the
only sanction that meaningfully ameliorates a defendant’s prejudice.
Courts can protect absentees’ due process rights by issuing a warning of
potential sanctions. Yet, when opt-out absentees fail to respond, it is
difficult for courts to discern whether that nonresponse is in bad faith.
Accordingly, courts should generally dismiss nonresponsive opt-out
members without prejudice. By contrast, because opt-in absentees have
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text.
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shown interest in the class action, their nonresponse is in bad faith.
Therefore, courts should generally dismiss nonresponsive opt-in members
with prejudice.

